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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES 
TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16000 
The Plaintiff-Appellant, Mountain States Telephone & 
Telegraph Company instituted suit in 1970, wherein it 
challenged the validity and constitutionality of Salt Lake 
City's Business Revenue Tax. However, in 1971 the Court 
dismissed that suit with prejudice, based on a stipulation 
of the litigants. Thereafter, in March 1978 the Plaintiff-
Company again filed suit, challenging the said Business 
Revenue Tax and, additionally, the City's Franchise Fee 
ordinance. 
In this latter Complaint, the Company alleges three 
causes of action: 
(a) That the Utility Revenue Tax and Business Franchise 
Fee of the City constituted a utility rate increase and 
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illegally usurped the prerogatives of the Public Service 
Commission; 
(b) That the Franchise Fee and Business Revenue Tax 
taxed the Telephone Company disproportionately, without a 
rational basis; and 
(c) That the City law discriminately classified the 
Company for City taxing purposes. This cause of action also 
alleged that the tax impositions were in violation of the 
requirements of 10-8-80 Utah Code Ann. and violated the 
requirements of the Federal and State Constitutions. 
DlSPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
The Plaip{;c- '.c t:=omolaint, including all of its alleged 
causes of action, vJas dismissed with prejudice on Salt Lake 
City's Hotion for Summary LTudgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT O'l l'oPPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent Salt Lake City seeks to have this 
Court affirm the judgment of the District Court and award 
costs to it. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
When viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the 
party against whom the ~1otion for Summary Judgment \vas 
brought, they demonstrate the following: 
l. The Appellant-Telephone Company (hereinafter 
"Company") obtained the riyht to use the City rnacls and other 
public ways for its own business purpos0s. In consideration 
-2-
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therefor, it agreed to pay 2% of its gross revenues derived 
from sales within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City 
for that "franchise" privilege. (Bill No. 78 of 1951 attach-
ed to Affidavit of City Recorder, Mildred v. Higham; R-150). 
Similar agreements and ordinances were adopted with reference 
to Mountain States Fuel Supply Company and the Utah Power 
& Light Company. (Bill No. 65 of 1953 and Bill No. 4 of 
1951, attached to Affidavit of Mildred v. Higham; R-150) 
2. On or about December 19, 1951, Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Company requested rate authority 
from the Public Service Commission of Utah to pass through 
to their customers franchise fees, license taxes and other 
local assessments; these assessments were to be a surcharge 
to customer billings on a pro-rata basis. Their request 
was approved and, on or about May 5, 1952, an order was 
issued by the Public Service Commission to add the pro-rata 
share of "taxes" and "impositions" of any city to a customer's 
bill. The Telephone Company, as requested, was specifically 
granted authority to pass through any increases in local 
taxes by merely filing with the Public Service Commission an 
amendment to the "Tax Adjustment Schedule." (Public Service 
Commission Report, Findings and Order dated May 5, 1952 and 
Admissions of Plaintiff dated May 14, 1978; R-178-191.) 
3. G9den City challenged the said Public Service Com-
mission order; however, the Attorney General and the Telephone 
('n•nrany' s present law firm successfully defended the Commis-
-3-
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sion's order in all particulars. 
4. In addition to the aforesaid "Franchise Fee," each 
of the three above stated utilities were the subject of a 
Business Revenue License Tax, which tax was levied on their 
gross income pursuant to an ordinance passed by the Salt Lake 
City Commission June 29, 1967. (Bill No. 38 of 1967, 
attached as Exhibit "6" to l\ffidavit of t1ildred v. Higham; 
R-150). 
5. The three said affected utilities instituted liti-
gation lo challenge the said Business Revenue License Tax. 
They asserted, ,,, "-'nq other issues, that the Revenue License 
Tax (as opposed to the Franchise Fee) was invalid: (l) As 
it conflicted with the provisions of the franchise agreement, 
(2) Because the tax exceede4 the City's legislative enabling 
power, (3) Because it was discriminatory against the three 
said utilities, in contravention to State law, plus the 
Federal and Utah Constitutions. (Complaint of the three 
above stated utilities versus Salt Lake City, Third District 
Court case No. 192098; R-439). 
6. Identical issues were also raised in a similar 
lawsuit filed against Ogden City; however, the Qyde~ case 
came for hearing before the Utah Supreme Court prior in time 
to the Salt Lake City litigation. 
as amicus curiae in that case and the Su~rcme Court issued 
an opinion affirming the enahl i ng ['ower of that city to levy 
-4-
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the Business Revenue Tax. Also, the Court held that the tax 
was not discriminatory or unlawful in any particular. 
(Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., et al. v. Ogden 
City, 26 U.2d 190, 487 P.2d 849 (Utah, 1971)). Subsequent 
to that ruling, the three named utility companies stipulated 
to a dismissal with prejudice, and their litigation, against 
Salt Lake City was dismissed. (Stipulation dated October 
12, 1971 and the Order of October 15, 1971; R-182, 445). 
7. On or about July 1, 1976, the Board of Salt Lake 
City Commissioners passed an ordinance increasing the Business 
Revenue License Tax from two to four percent to balance its 
1976-77 fiscal year budget. (Bill No. 115 of 1976; R-151). 
8. On or about June 30, 1977, the Board of Salt Lake 
City Commissioners passed an ordinance increasing the Business 
Revenue Tax on the three named utilities in an amount equal 
to six percent of their gross revenue. (Bill No. 110 of 
1977; R-151). 
9. The Business Revenue Tax is not a "regulatory" 
provision; rather, the ordinance provision concerning the 
revenue tax specifically provides that it is not a substitute 
for other regulatory ordinances and enacted ". solely 
to raise revenue for municipal purposes. (Section 
20-3-12.3 Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965; 
R-408-410). 
10. For the 1977-78 fiscal year, Salt Lake City general 
fund budget totalled $39,800,000. In that budget, the 
-5-
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Utility Franchise Fee and the Utility Business Revenue License 
Tax estimated revenue totctlled $8,000,000. Thus, the said 
sources of revenue represent 20% of the City's general revenue 
budget. A loss of said income would cripple the delivery of 
municipal services, funded by the general fund, which includes 
police, fire, street maintenance, garbage pickup and other 
essential life supporting services provided by the City. 
(Affidavit of City Auditor, K. Ray Hammond, R-406, 407) 
11. On July 26, 1977 (before this suit was filed), 
the City enacted Section 20-3-14.1 of the Revised City Ordin-
ances which provided that there would also be levied a 6% 
gross revenue buc: ~--~s tax on every business or company 
engaged in business, within the corporate limits of Salt Lake 
City, supplying telephone service, gas or electrical energy 
service in competition with the three above named utility 
companies. (R-6, 7, 14; SR-57, 236; SR-257). 
12. The business organizations chiefly affected by 
the above stated ordinance have contested the tax by arguing, 
among other assertions, that they are not in "competition" 
with the Telephone Company in providing "Local Exchange 
Service" which is the service taxable under the law. (SR-237; 
SR-238; SR-257, 258). 
13. The Telephone Company, on frequent occasions, met 
with representatives of this office and those other competi-
tors who arguably could be subject to the additional taxation. 
The City has sought to obtain adequate info~mation with which 
-6-
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to evaluate the respective positions and it has received 
some; however, the Telephone Company has never provided 
the financial data which the City and counsel representing 
one of the alleged competitors of the Telephone Company 
understood would be supplied. (R-257-258). 
14. The Telephone Company has not alleged in its com-
plaint that the City has acted in bad faith in enforcing 
the ordinance. (R-2-8). In fact, the City has vigorously 
attempted to resolve the factual and legal disputes involved, 
and is proceeding with vigor, equally and in good faith to 
enforce its taxing ordinances against all persons who may 
legally come under the law's provisons. It fully intends 
to collect and enforce said ordinances as soon as definitional, 
legal and conceptual problems in this specialized industry 
can be resolved. (R-257, 258; Cf. the refusal of the Tele-
phone Company to respond to interrogatories on this subject 
in Interrogatory Nos. 23, 24 and 25 of the Telephone Company's 
Answer to the City's First Set of Interrogatories, R-188-
190). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ASSERTION THAT SALT LAKE CITY IS 
ILLEGALLY SETTING UTILITY RATE SCHEDULES 
THROUGH ITS TAXING POl•lERS, CONTRARY 
TO THE POWERS VESTED IN THE UTAH PUBLIC 
SERVICE COHI'1ISSION, IS UNFOUNDED. 
A. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION TARIFF 
ORDER DIRECTED AN AUTOMATIC RATE AD.JUST-
MENT EQUAL TO LOCAL TAX OR FRANCHISE 
FEE IMPOSITIONS. 
-7-
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It is to be noted that the Telephone Company's complaint 
asserts that the Respondent, Salt Lake City, is illegally 
setting rate schedules, which power is expressly vested in 
the Utah Public Service Commission. However, the undisputed 
facts demonstrate that on or about December 19, 1951 Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Company requested the Utah 
Public Service Commission to am0nd its general tariff orders 
and authorize that Company to p ss through to its customers 
(as a surcharge) local taxes levied against the Company on a 
pro-rata basis. 
In summarizing the position of the Plaintiff-Company, 
the Public Servic2 ~ommission stated: 
"Mountain States [the plaintiff] contends that 
fair and non-discriminatory rates require the 
recovery of these expenses [municipal taxes] 
apart from state-wide rate schedules, and has 
filed the tariff in question to accomplish such 
results." Public Service Commission of Utah 
Investigation and Suspension Docket No. 83, 
Reports, Findings and Order, R-30. 
The Commission noted that municipal sales, use, occupation, 
franchise, gross receipts and other charges against utilities 
had evolved to become a significant factor in utility expenses. 
As such, to include them within the State-wide rate would 
constitute a discrimination against users resioing o_ut: _ _:;idEC.__ 
the respective municipalities. Therefore, it stated with 
respect to the Telephone Company's 1951 proposal: 
"Mountain States under the proposeo tariff, 
would recover the amount of such tax expenses 
from the users of its service within the 
respective municipalities assessing such 
-8-
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taxes and impositions." 
Id. at p. 4. I.& S. Docket No. 83, 
Thereafter, the Commission noted that these local taxes 
were likely to continue to raise. It observed: 
"It is equally apparent that as the costs of 
operating municipal governments grow levies for 
these various taxes and fees are likely to in-
crease unevenly, thereby accentuating the dis-
crimination." I.& S. Docket No. 83, Id. at 
p. 6; R-33. 
The Commission then correctly noted that the cities had the 
power to increase these taxes. It observed: 
"Apparently each city or town may increase or 
decrease these exactions in its own discretion. 
This being so these impositions will continue 
to fluctuate widely so that rates constructed to 
spread these expanses to users of telephone 
service throughout the State have the aspect of 
unlawful discrimination." I.& S. Docket No. 
~, Id. at p. 9; R-36. 
Thus, the Commission granted the plaintiff's 1952 
request for flexible authority to pass on any local taxes 
on a pro-rata basis. The utility company was directed to file 
a "Tax Adjustment Schedule," showing all of these special 
taxes and impositions which had been imposed by a city or 
town; thereafter, it was authorized to pass on the new tariff 
rate as a surcharge to its billing, without a new rate hear-
ing. The Commission specifically ruled and held: 
"Upon the filing of such Tax Adjustment Sche-
dule as above provided, the company is authorized 
and directed to change the rates for exchange 
service and the exchanges affected thereby 
·nmposition of municipal taxes), in accordance 
with such schedule and said tariff, on billing 
cLi"ted immedi_a__1:~ subsegue!"lt thereto." ~­
Docket-No~--83, Id. at p. 12; R-39 (Emphasls 
adrfocf) .-----
-9-
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Further, the Plaintiff was specifically authorized to file 
amended schedules as new taxes or extractions were levied 
in the future by cities. The order specifically provided: 
"Said company [plaintiff] shall file from time 
to time amendments and revisions of said Tax 
Adjustment Schedule at the rates and amounts of 
such taxes, imposition and other charges, or 
the base on which the tax or imposition is 
measured are changed, altered or amended. 
I.& S. Dock(0_~~8_l, Id. at p. 12; R-39. 
This order was challenged in court and this Court affirmed it 
in all particulars. The Court summarized the central issue 
as follows: 
"The question remains: Can the commission per-
mit a ut i_l: t, to charge and bill subscribers 
of an arc,o, for paymPnt of imposts on the 
company levied by local governmental authority 
of that area?" Qqden Cit_y_~__.__l"__ublic;_ Serv~c:~ 
Commission, 260 P.2d 751, 753 (Utah, 1953). 
Thereafter, the Court reviewed some of the abundant authority 
upholding similar decisions of Public Service Commissions 
across the country and held as follows: 
"[The Commission Order surcharging local taxes) 
conf0rms more nearly to the views of this court , 
particularly where, as here, ever-changing and 
probably ever-increasing local imposts appear on 
the horizon which neither the legislature nor 
the company to date has controlled, and where, 
should we conc-lUde- otherv:{se,dTSCrlmination 
would fluctuate in-direct_E_~_port_io__rl____t:_o the 
actions of a myriad of local _governin__g___l:J_cldies." 
csgden---ci t-y v -:--Pub Tic -servi c-e-comm:lssion, 12L ~ 
at p. 7 53 (Emphasis added)-.--------~ 
* * * 
"The order of the Commission is not only an 
exercise of i t_s_le___g:_~authCJ__r__ itjr;_lJut app-cir s_ 
t:_Q_bas_ic equities, -at least eliminating nne 
discrimination in a field where it is irnpos'3ihle 
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to eliminate them all," Id. at p. 754 (Emphasis 
added). 
Other jurisdictions which have considered the problem 
have likewise, with unanimity, upheld Public Service Commis-
sian orders allowing utility companies to pass on local taxes 
as a surcharge on their current billing, without new rate 
hearings. 
On such well reasoned and authoritative opinion is the 
decision of the City of Scottsbluff v. United Tel. Co. of 
the 1\lest, 106 N.1<1.2d 12 (Neb., 1960). In this case the court 
discussed the several alternatives for tariff adjustments 
to cover the expense of local taxation. It noted that the 
surcharge method of passing through the taxes on a pro-rata 
basis avoided the problems of discrimination on other utility 
subscribers, living outside that city. It also correctly 
noted that such an automatic surcharge increase avoided the 
costly and time consuming problem of frequent rate hearings, 
whenever local taxes were increased. The Court then succinctly 
held: 
"We are convinced that the department [Commission 
fixing telephone rates], in so far as such taxes 
[local city occupation tax] are concerned, has 
the power to fix special exchange rates appli-
cable to the different communities, which will 
in effect require the ratepayers in each com-
i11un:L fy-to absorb a sum equal to the amount of 
the tax which respondent is required to pay 
to that municipality." City of Scottsbluff v. 
United Tel. Co. of the 1\lest, Id. at p. 20 
(Emphasis~added). 
For other cases with similar ruling as Utah and Nebraska, 
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see: State ex rel Pacific Tel. & Teleg~h Co. v. Dept. of 
Public Service, 142 P.2d 498 (Wash., 1943), cited with appro-
val by the Utah Supreme Court; c:::_ity_of Newport News v. 
Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 96 S.E.2d 145 (Va.) 
Village ~f Ma)'wood v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 178 
N.E.2d 345 (Ill., 1961); ~ity of Elmhurst v. Western United 
Gas & Electric Co., l N.E.2d 489 (Ill., 1946); City__c:>!_ 
Scottsbluff v. United Telephone of the West, 106 N.W.2d 
12 (Neb., 1960); State ex rel City of Seattle v. Dept. of 
Public Uj:_i_l i t~es, 207 P. 2d 712 (Wash., 1949); Colorado 
960 (Cole'. ;_ lJ 7 0) . 
It is respectfully submitted that the Public Service 
Commission of Utah has power to hold hearings and determine 
the appropriate utilitv rates. See, 54-7-l et seq. Utah 
Code Ann., 1953, as amended. They have exercised that power 
as detailed above and permitted local impositions of taxes 
and fees to be made as an additure to utility billing. 
Separate and apart from the Commission's power, under 
clear Utah law, a City has power to impose occupation taxes 
or fees for the use of its public property as provided in 
Section 10-8-80 Utah Code Ann., 1953. The power to raise 
taxes for City purposes is a separate function, belonging to 
local government. It is entirely distinguishable from the 
rate-making authority of the Public Service Commission in 
deciding how such costs 1nay or rnay not be inc1ur1ed in lhe 
-12-
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charges ultimately made by the utility companies to their 
customers. 
Regarding the latter issue, the Public Service Commission 
has set those rates to automatically be adjusted upward to 
reflect the local tax increases, by a surcharge on a customer's 
bill. This tariff order has been approved by the Utah Supreme 
Court. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the 
Telephone Company's assertion that the City has somehow usurped 
the function of the Public Service Commission is specious. 
Appellant has presented no basis in law or fact to justify 
relief. Thus, the complaint was properly dismissed by the 
lower court. 
B. APPELLANT'S CASES DO NOT STAND FOR THE 
PROPOSITION CITED, AND DO NOT HOLD FOR 
A POSITION CONTRARY TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
CO~~ISSION ORDER OR THE UTAH DECISION 
UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY OF THAT ORDER. 
It is interesting to note that the Appellant-Telephone 
Company has had all the above cited cases upholding the valid-
ity of the similar Public Service orders for over four 
months. These other jurisdictions affirmed virtually identi-
cal systems to Utah, which set utility rates to include 
future tax increases by merely filing notice of the increased 
tax cost with the regulatory body. 
However, significantly, Appellant has not even mentioned 
those cases or attempted to distinguish those authorities 
supporting the City's position in its brief. Rather, it has 
r:it 0 d thr0'e cases, whose holdings are irrelevant and immaterial 
-13-
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to the issue before the Court. Seep. 18 of Appellant's 
Brief. Please note: 
1. Appellant cites Dvorkin v. Illinois Bell, 340 
N.E.2d 98 (Ill.App., 1975) for the proposition that the 
Public Service Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to 
set utility rates. The City has no disagreement with that 
assertion, but it is not at issue in this case. Rather, 
the undisputed facts of record demonstrate that the rate 
schedules were adopted by the Public Service Commission. 
These rate formulas permitted the utilities to automatically 
adjust the schedule by filing notice of a taxing cost in-
crease which was then included as additure on the rate 
tariff auth~rity, without an additional rate hearing. 
Further, it is important to note that the Illinois 
Bell case does not stand for the proposition that such a 
self-implementing rate adjustment order by the Public 
Service Commission is illegal as inferred by Appellant. 
Rather, that case dealt exclusively with an allegation by 
a customer that a telephone company's practice of providing 
free service to retired officers, directors and employees 
violated the Public Utilities Act of that jurisdiction. 
The theory of the plaintiff in that litigation was that 
other customers were charged higher rates to subsidize the 
privileged class of former company employees. The plaintiff 
sought to have the Court fix the utility rates by ordering 
a reduction of rates for the class of which he was a member. 
-14-
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The Court correctly noted in dicta it would be a usurpa-
tion of the function of the Commission for the Court to fix 
the rates, as requested. However, the Court's decision, 
denying the requested relief, was premised on the fact that 
the plaintiff did not appeal from the administrative decision 
of the Commission when that regulatory body considered the 
precise issue raised in the litigation. Thus, the Court held 
as follows: 
"The doctrine of exhaustion has long been a 
basic principle of administrative law, and a 
party aggrieved by administrative action 
ordinarily cannot seek review in the courts 
without first pursuing all administrative 
remedies available to him. Id. at 
p. lOS. 
Obviously, the case does not stand for proposition that 
the order of the Utah Public Service Commission is or was 
illegal. Further, it does not hold that local government 
may not increase its taxes for utilities for the utilities 
to pay in any way they may deem logal or appropriate. How-
ever, it does stand for the proposition that one cannot 
collaterally attach a Commission order when one has failed 
to exhaust administrative remedies, which the Telephone 
Company has done in this case and which point will be dis-
cussed hereafter at page 17. 
2. The case of Mississippi Public Service Commission 
v. Home Telephone Company, 110 S.2d 618 (Miss., 1959) 
cited at p. 18 of Appellant's Brief is not related factually 
or in legal principle to the issues before the Court. In 
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this case, a challenge was made concerning certain alleged 
business expenses which were used by the Public Service 
Commission in setting telephone company rates. The Court 
ruled that the Public Service Commission had the power to 
refuse to consider excessively high salaries in setting 
utility rates. It held that the Commission could not pro-
hibit the payment of such salaries, but it could exclude 
from "operating expenses" the excess payments, when calcu-
lating costs for rate-setting purposes. 
The Court further noted that the function of rate-
making wos legislative in character and that the Court could 
not fix t~e public util1ty rates. Rather, it was the Court's 
function to ,ietermine whether the Public Service Commission 
proceeding was conducted in harmony with law, the conclu-
sions were supported by substantial evidence or whether the 
rates constituted a co~fiscatory taking. The Mississippi 
Court noted that the lower court erred in fixing a rate of 
return for the Telephone Company and, further, correctly 
stated: 
"The function of rate making is purely 
legislative in character. It is not within 
the power of a court to fix the rates to 
be charged by public utilities, although a 
court may restrain the imposition of a confisca-
tory rates, or, under the Public Utility Act, 
determine whether the rates as fixed are sup-
ported by substantial evidence or within the 
other statutory restrictions set forth in 
[the] Code, (citations omitted)." 
Id. at p. 626. 
The case before the bar docs not h~ve an issue concerning 
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what salaries may be used as operating expense, and there 
is no issue of a court attempting to set a utility rate. 
That ruling simply does not relate to the issues of this 
case. 
3. Similarly, the case of State of Texas v. Southwes-
tern Bell Telephone Company, cited at p. 18 of Appellant's 
Brief is unrelated to any issue before the Court. In that 
case, a privately owned telephone company, in a jurisdiction 
unregulated by a governmental regulatory agency, increased 
the rate for its intra-state long distance telephone calls. 
The rate increase was challenged by the Attorney General of 
the State as excessive. 
The appellate Court held that in the absence of regula-
tion, by an authorized governmental body, the private utility 
company could set its own intra-state rates, subject to 
judicial review under common la1v principles. After citing 
authority for the proposition that such utility rates were 
subject to the limitations dictated by "reasonableness" 
and "justice," the Court held: 
"This legal obligation upon the telephone 
company--that of not extracting exorbitant 
or unreasonable charges for its services--
would be meaningless if there were no judicial 
redress for its violation." Id. at 526 S.W.2d 
529. 
Again, the facts of this case and its holding have no appli-
cability to the issues before this Court. 
c. THE APPELLANT-COMPANY )lAY NOT COLLATER-
ALLY ATTACK A PUBLIC CO~IISSION ORDER, 
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PROMULGATED AT APPELLANT'S REQUEST AND 
JUDICIALLY DEFENDED BY APPELLANT, WilEN 
IT DID NOT EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDIES TO CHALLENGE OR MODIFY THE 
ORDER. 
The undisputed facts of record clearly demonstrate 
that the City has not undertaken to fix utility rates; 
rather, the Telephone Company in the instant case has utilized 
a 1952 Public Service Commission order to pass through cer-
tain City assessments to its customers on a pro-rata basis. 
It has implemented this Public Service Commission order by 
filing "Adjusted Tax Schedules," as per the requirements of 
that order. See Statement of Facts 1-3, supra. 
Further, it is of significant import that the Telephone 
Company has, at no time since the entry of the Public Ser-
vice Commission Order in 1952, sought to rescind or amend 
that Order or to seek judicial review of it. In fact (as 
noted in the Statement of ?acts), the Telephone Company and 
its present counsel obtained the Order through its own 
petition to the Public Service Commission and successfully 
judicially defended that Order. 
The law concerning Public Service Commission orders 
provides: 
"The Commission may at any time, upon notice 
to the public utility affected and after 
opportunity to be heard as provided in the 
case of complaints, rescind, alter or amend 
any order or decision made by it. Any order 
rescinding, altering or amending a prior 
order or decision shall when served upon the 
Public Utility affected h~v0 the same effect 
as herein provided for original orders or 
decisions." 54-7-13 Uloh Code Ann., 1953 (Emphasis added). -~ ·- ----~ 
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Further, the law specifically provides: 
"In all collateral actions or proceedings 
the orders and decisions of the Commission 
which have become final shall be conclusive." 
54-7-14 Utah Code Ann., 1953 (Emphasis added). 
It is further to be noted that certiorari must be applied 
for within 30 days after an application for rehearing is 
denied or within 30 days after the rendition of a decision 
on rehearing; otherwise, the decision is final and not 
assailable. See, 54-7-16 Utah Code Ann., 1953. 
This Court and other jurisdictions have consistently 
held that these administrative decisions cannot be collater-
ally attacked. These decisions are final, if appropriate 
review is not obtained by petitioning for a rehearing, 
seeking an amendment or modification or (where appropriate) 
seeking timely judicial revie1·1 of the decision. North Salt 
Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation Co., 118 Utah 600, 
223 P.2d 577 (1950); Dvorkin v. Illinois Bell, 340 N.E.2d 
98 (Ill.App. 1975). 
In the instant case, the Telephone Company is clearly 
attempting to collaterally attack an order it obtained. It 
has not sought to amend, modify or rescind, as required by 
law; further, it is an order '.'lhich the Telephone Company 
has not sought to otherwise have administratively or judicially 
reviewed. 
In addition, it is signi=icant that the collateral 
attack it now seeks is selecti·.'e and applies only to Salt 
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Lake City. Since 1952, when the original commission order 
was entered at the request of the Telephone Company, that 
Company has annually filed amendments to its Tax Adjust-
ment Schedules with the Public Service Commission, to take 
benefit of that order, by passing through to its customers 
the local tax impositions. (R-291, 228). 
As late as January 5, 1978, it filed its "Municipal 
Charge Adjustment Schedule," wherein it listed the tax 
schedules of 41 Utah municipalities from American Fork through 
Vernal. The Company thereby obtained legal sanction to pass 
through to its customers the tax impositions of these juris-
dictions vntlF'•-•l the need of further hearings before the Public 
Service Commission or internal absorption of these costs 
of doing business. See R-228. 
Thus, it is apparent that the Telephone Company seeks 
to have the advantage of the automatic rate increase schedule 
provided by the Public Service Commission and, yet (in this 
litigation) selectively seek its application. The statutory 
and case law prohibitions against collateral attack were 
certainly intended to avoid such duplicatious dealing, 
where a utility could retain the advantages of an order, 
avoid a full review by the administrative body, yet seek 
selective and limited judicial remedies. 
It is respectfully submitted that the lower court de-
cision dismissing the Plaintiff-Appellant's claim that 
the City is setting utility rates contrary to the Public 
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Service Commission authority is and was correct. The Tele-
phone Company's claim is ludicrous, specious and unfounded 
in law or fact. This judicial action is, in fact, an illegal 
collateral attack on a Public Service Commission order, 
implemented at the request of the Telephone Company. Thus, 
the lower court decision should be affirmed by this Court. 
POINT II 
THERE EXISTS NO FACTS TO SUPPORT 
ANY ALLEGATION OF THE TELEPHONE 
COMPANY THAT THE ORDINANCE BEFORE 
THE COURT IS FACIALLY INVALID OR 
HAS BEE!J DISCRH1INATORILY APPLIED 
OR ADMINISTERED; FURTHER, APPELLANT'S 
COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM 
UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED ON 
THESE THEORIES. 
The Telephone Company-Appellant, in its brief, stresses 
that the lower court erred in failing to take cognizance 
of alleged disputed issues of fact concerning its competition, 
subsequent to the Telerant decision. Its Brief co-mingles 
the two separate legal theories concerning alleged "facial" 
and "as applied" discriminatory treatment. Further, it 
incorrectly asserts that the City does not require its competi-
tors to pay the same business taxes as it does. A proper 
evaluation of the theories require that they be discussed 
separately. 
A. THE CITY BUSINESS REVENUE TAXING 
ORDINANCE, ON ITS FACE, TREATS ALL 
PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED THE SAME 
AND CONSTITUTIONALLY CLASSIFIES 
TAXPAYERS. 
It must be noted that the City law under discussion 
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specifically provides that the Business Revenue Tax applies 
to the three public service utilities and their competitors. 
It expressly provides: 
"There is hereby levied upon the business of 
every person or company engaged in the business 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, of supplying tele-
phone service, gas or electric energy service 
in competition with public utilities, an 
annual license tax equal to six percentum of 
the gross revenue derived from the sale and 
use of such competitive services delivered 
from and after November 1, 1977, within the 
corporate limits of Salt Lake City. 
"'In competition with public utilities' shall 
mean to trade in products or services within 
the same market as a public utility taxed 
under section 14 of this chapter." 20-3-14.1 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1965, 
as amended,, R-6, 14. 
Thus, it is clear that, even if one assumes that proper 
classification requires that appellant's competitors be 
included within the scope of the taxing law, the ordinance 
is per se proper in its scope and classification. 1 
Appellant has cited three cases to support its "Point 
I" assertion that there exist issues of fact requiring a 
hearing to demonstrate discriminatory tax collection practices 
by the City. However, none of these cases dealt with dis-
criminatory application of a valid statute; rather, each 
involved a law, invalid on its face, for failure to include 
within its scope those persons similarly situated. For 
example: 
1. Note: The City asserts that there is no such requirement, 
which issue is discussed hereafter in Point III. 
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1. Salt Lake City v. Utah Light and Railway Co., 45 
Utah 50, 142 P.2d 1067 (1944) is cited at page 9 of Appellant's 
Brief. In this case, the Court affirmed the power of the 
city to impose an occupation tax in addition to a franchise 
fee. It stated that the tax, levied in addition to the 
franchise payments for the Company's use of city streets, 
was legal. It stated: 
"Neither is there any question concerning the 
right of the city to impose an occupation or 
license tax." Id. at p. 1070, citing Salt Lake 
City v. Christensen, 34 Utah 38, 95 P. 523. 
Thereafter, it analysed the city ordinance and observed 
that it did not tax all within the appropriate business 
class. Rather, the ordinance specifically taxed only those 
businesses distributing electricity through "meters". The 
stipulated facts showed that many other businesses distri-
buted electricity, without using meters. Therefore, the 
court held the law invalid on its face by stating: 
"But in limiting the tax to those who use 
meters for the purpose mentioned in the 
ordinance destroys its uniformity." Id. 
at p. 1071. 
In the case before the bar, the ordinance has no such 
restriction. In fact, it specifically taxes all those 
businesses "in competition" with the taxed utilities. Ob-
viously, there is no similarity to the facial invalidity 
of the 1914 statute and the one before this Court. 
2. In Orem City v. Pyne (discussed at p. 13 of Appel-
lilnt's Brief), the Court like\·lise found an improper facial 
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classification in the ordinance. Here, a seller of tangible 
personal property (used cars) was subject to a license tax 
of up to $300, but other retail sellers of tangible property 
(e.g., implement dealers or appliance shops), doing business 
at the same volume, were taxed to a maximum of $25. The 
lower court correctly observed: 
"Our [the court's] function is to determine 
whether an enactment operates equally upon 
all persons similarly situated." Orem City 
v. Pyne, 4th Dist. Case No. 4039 (1964), 
R-264 cited in Orem City v. Pyne, 16 Utah 2d 
355, 401 P.2d 181 (1965). 
Thus, the Pyne Court ruled the ordinance void. 
Obviously, there is no similarity in the ordinance 
under analysis and the one ruled defective in the Pyne case. 
The Orem ordinance did not deal with public utilities and 
did not purport to tax them or their competitors. There-
fore, it can be of little assistance to this Court, except 
restating the accepted legal principle that classifications 
between groups of taxpayers cannot be whimsical or capricious. 
3. In Slater v. Salt Lake City, (cited at page 14 of 
Appellant's brief), this Court refused to enjoin the enforce-
ment of a city law prohibiting sidewalk commercial solicita-
tions, in the City's central business district. However, in 
so ruling, it held one provision of the ordinance discrimina-
tory because it permitted the sale of receipts, redeemable 
in photographs, but prohibited the sale of magazine subscrip-
tions. The Court found this distinction, on its face, to 
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be an unreasonable classification of persons "similarly 
situated". 
Significantly, the Court did not address the alleged 
issue of discriminatory application of the law. Rather, in 
its lengthy discussion (which approved virtually all other 
legislative classifications), the Court aptly summarized the 
legal standards to be applied by the Court in reviewing 
legislative classifications; e.g.: 
(a) The legislative body has the widest latitude in 
formulating classifications; the court will not concern 
itself with policy decisions. The Court observed: 
"In fixing the limits of the class, the legis-
lative body has a wide discretion and this 
court may not concern itself with the wis-
dom or policy of the law." Slater v. Salt 
Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153, 160 
(1949). 
(b) Distinctions between classes are constitutional, 
unless they are "unreasonable"; that is, the legislature 
may not make classifications that are arbitrary and capricious 
in light of the purpose of the act, by treating persons 
similarly situated differently. The Court stated: 
. if we are unable to find any reasonable 
basis for the classification, then we cannot 
sustain the enactment. 'There must be 
a reasonable basis for the differentiation 
between that class . ., which basis must 
bear a reasonable relation to the purposes to 
be accomplished by the imposition of the 
condition. If those subjected to the condition 
are similarly situated to those free from the 
condition, the differentiation would be with-
out basis and hence arbitrary and therefore 
unconstitutional. '" Slater v. Salt Lake 
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City, Id. at p. 163, quoting Wallberg v. Pub-
Ticlvelfare Comm., at 203 P. 2d 94T(Emphasis 
added). 
It must be specifically noted that the majority of the 
ordinance's classifications were upheld as "based on reason". 
The Court approved permits for the magazine sales, religious 
solicitations, sight seeing trip sales and other exceptions 
to the general prohibition of sidewalk vending, and noted: 
"There is a valid and reasonable ground 
of distinction with nothing arbitrary 
about it." Id. at p. 163. 
The City has no quarrel with these points of law, which 
are further discussed in Point IV, infra. However, contrary 
to the T2lr,)"one Company's assertion in its brief, there are 
no issues cf fact to be determined on the per se or facial 
validity of the law. Rather, as Appellant points out at 
length in its Brief, the Telephone Company has matters of 
record, asserting that it is losing business to terminal 
unit sales competitors. These facts, for the purpose of the 
summary judgment motion, are assumed to be correct. 
There may be issued as to whether "terminal" equipment 
competitors are in the business of selling "Local Exchange 
Telephone Services," taxable under the City ordinance and, 
thus not subject to the tax. This phrase, however, is one 
of art in the communication industry and the phrase appar-
ently excludes sales of "terminal ec1uipment." See, Statement 
of Fact 12; SR-2 37, 238; SR-2 57, 2 58. Further, there are 
issues of causation between the tax and the competitive loss 
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by the Company. 
Importantly, however, the City ordinance now under 
evaluation, specifically includes the "competitors" of the 
Telephone Company in the taxing scheme. Thus, there are no 
factual issues to resolve on the facial or per se validity 
of the ordinance classifications. The Appellant-Company 
has simply improperly confused two separate legal theories 
in alleging that a factual issue exists concerning the 
classification problem. 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the lower 
court correctly held that the ordinance was facially valid 
and that it did not discriminatorily classify similarly 
situated taxpayers. No case cited by Appellant is similar, 
in fact, to the ordinance under discussion. The City law, 
on its fact, clearly includes all those in competition with 
the Appellant and patently includes within its scope all 
those persons similarly situated. Thus, no classification 
principle has been violated and, as a matter of law, the 
ordinance is facially valid. 
B. THE TELEPHONE COMPANY HAS FAILED TO 
STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE 
GRANTED AND, FURTHER, THERE EXISTS NO 
DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT TO SUPPORT AN 
ALLEGATION THAT THE ORDINANCE BEFORE 
THE COURT HAS BEEN DISCRIMINATORILY 
APPLIED OR ADMINISTERED. 
The law concerning a theory of discriminatory applica-
tion of a taxing statute is well defined in case law. This 
C'<lllrt has surcj nctly stated: 
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"However, before this result is reached 
[avoiding lax liability on the grounds of 
discriminato~y application of a taxing 
statute], it must be shown that there is an 
intentional and systematic violation of those 
constitutional principles, or some designed 
effort to violate them, to the injury of 
the complainant. 
* * * 
"A merely mistaken or inadvertent failure to 
properly apply the law, even if it results in 
discrimination, does not provide a basis for 
recovery by a taxpayer because of violation of 
his constitutional guarantees. It would be 
a doctrine hazardous indeed to the taxing 
process and to the maintenance of government 
to rule that if the assessor has made mis-
takes in taxing others, a complaining tax-
payer could escape taxation. The result would 
be that the law could not be applied to anyone 
until 1t was correctly applied to all. It 
requl~es very little imagination to see that 
this would extend, not curtail, noncompliance 
with the law. Even though it may be difficult 
or impossible to achieve completely, the 
desideratum, of course, is that there be 
uniformity and equality in taxation, and that 
is the objective to be constantly pursued. 
However, the fact that this ideal is not reached 
should not be permitted to discourage attempts 
of taxing officials to bring it about, nor 
to defeat the legislative purpose. Where 
some taxpayers are not being taxed in accor-
dance with the law, the proper way to rectify 
the situation is by proceeding toward uni-
form and proper application and not by ex-
tending the erroneous application to others." 
Thiokol Chemical Corooration v. Peterson, 
15 U. 2d- 353, 393 P. 2d 391, 396 (Utah, 1964) 
and authorities therein cited (Emphasis 
added). See also, Salt Lake City v. Robbins, 
450 P.2d 730 (Utah, 1976). 
It must specifically be noted that there is no allega-
tion in Appellant's complaint that there exists a systematic 
and intentional failure to equally enforce the taxing statute. 
-2R-
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Sec, the Company's Third Cause of Action, R-6. Thus, the 
Telephone Company failed to state a claim to support such 
a theory, by failing to allege an intentional and systematic 
violation. Further, the undisputed facts will not support 
that theory, even if the complaint were amended. 
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Salt Lake City 
specifically requested the Telephone Company to outline 
what businesses Salt Lake City has allegedly failed to 
tax uniformly. Further, the City requested detailed infer-
mation concerning what meetings the Compuny and City 
have had, with others, in an attempt to properly interpret 
the City's motive in enforcing its taxing ordinance and bring 
all those who should be covered within its collection ambit. 
The Court will note from the responses to Interrogatories 
No. 23 and 24 that the Company, in essence, stated that: 
(a) It could not name any business who was allegedly sub-
ject to the tax, which was not being taxed, that information 
being in the possession of the City and, (b) Refused to 
provide that information, asserting that it was irrelevant 
and ". . not reasonably likely to elicit relevant informa-
tion, or lead to the discovery of relevant information in 
this matter." See, Ans1ver to Interrogatory No. 24 of the 
Appellant's First Set of Interrogatories, R-189, 190. 
However, the affidavit filed by the City demonstrate~ 
th,1 t the ordinance provision which included "competitors" 
0 ; t)p• utilities in the taxing ambit 1vas added subsequent 
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to 1967, in an attempt to meet objections of the Company, 
that competitors had an advantage. This amendment was made 
even though this Court had previously ruled that the 
classification of the telephone, gas and electric companies 
was valid. The amendment to include their competition was 
added in an effort to make the taxation scheme even more 
equitable. See, §20-3-14.1 quoted at page 22, supra. 
Since that date, numerous meetings have been held 
between the plaintiff and other organizations which are 
allegedly in competition with the Telephone Company, to define 
whether they are legitimately within the ambit of the ordin-
ance's taxing provisions. Further, legal research and evalua-
tion is coGLinuing as to the other company's assertion that 
such a taxation scheme violates prohibitions against burdenim 
interstate commerce and other substantial legal issues and 
interpretations. See, State~ent of Fact No. 13. 
The undisputed facts demonstrate that the City has not 
knowingly or intentionally failed to assess or collect a 
revenue license fee from any person which was legally due. 
It has extended a good faith effort to assess and collect 
from every person within the de signa ted class their appropriatE 
taxes. Thus, the lower court was correct, as a matter of 
law and as a matter of fact, in denying the Company's claim 
of discriminatory application of a taxing statute. 
The Company may not escape taxation on such a ground; 
rather, the appropriate remedy, as cited in the above cap-
- 3ll--
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tioncd cases, would be to compel the City to likewise tax 
those who may not be included within the ambit of collec-
tion, if such an assertion were appropriate. 
POINT III 
THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE PLAINTIFF AND 
TWO OTHER PUBLIC UTILITIES, SUBJECTING 
THESE TO GROSS REVENUE BUSINESS OCCUPA-
TION TAX IS NOT DISCRIMINATORY, BUT IS 
CONSTITUTIONAL IN ALL PARTICULARS. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the City has attempted 
to accomodate the real or alleged competitive disadvantages 
occasioned by the City Business Revenue •rax by taxing compe-
titors, a classification of the three public utilities alone 
would be a valid classification, as a matter of law. 
The general rule with regard to the levy of any tax is 
set forth in McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, which states 
as follows: 
"Classification or persons or property, or 
both, for taxing purposes is sanctioned, 
provided, of course, that such classifica-
tion is fair, reasonable and not arbitrary 
or whimsical, and based on substantial 
distinctions. Stating the rule more com-
prehensively, the classification of persons 
or occupations for the purpose of municipal 
taxation, when founded on natural, intrin-
sic or fundamental distinctions which are 
reasonable in their relation to the object 
of legislation and otherwise, will be deemed 
valid and binding. 
"In this respect the legislature is accorded 
a broad range of discretion, which will 
not be interfered with by the courts unless 
it is clearly apparent that the tax_imposed 
is arbitrary, unreasonable, oppresslve or 
prohibitive." 16 McQuillin, Municipal 
corpciratior1-s §44.20 (Rev.Vol. 1972) (Empha-
sis ac1de>r1) . 
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A case closely in point is the New York Rapid Transit 
Corp. v. New York City, 303 U.S. 573 (N.Y., 1938). Here, 
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of an excise tax 
levied on every utility doing business within the City of 
New York, but which separated common carriers in a separate 
class. The Court held: 
it has long been the law under the 
14th Amendment that a distinction in legis-
lation is not arbitrary, if any state of 
facts reasonably can be conceived that would 
sustain it, 
"Since carriers or other utilities with the 
right of eminent domain, the use of public 
property, special franchises or public con-
tracts, have many points of distinction 
from ether businesses, including relative 
fre-e-:1om from competition, especially signifi-
cant with increasing density of population 
and municipal expansion, these public 
service organization have no valid ground 
by virtue of the equal protection clause 
to obejct to separate treatment related 
to such distinctions. Carriers may be 
treated as a separate class [omitting 
cases cited] and, as such, taxed different-
ly or additionally. [Omitting citations] 
This Court has approved the adoption of modes 
and methods of assessment and administra-
tion peculiar to railroads [omitting 
citations] and upheld tax rates for rail-
roads differing from those on other property, 
and as between railroad taxpayers [omitting 
citations]. Similarly, we have explicitly 
recognized that a state may subject public 
service corporations to a special or 
higher income tax than individuals or 
other corporations." [Omitting citations] 
Id. at p. 578-579 (Emphasis added). 
The propriety of classifying the three service utilities 
has already been resolved in the favor of Salt Lake City. 
In a case involving this precise issue, this Court specificali 
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hclcl: 
"The plaintiffs [including the plaintiff 
Telephone Company] comprise a distinct class 
of businesses within the public utility 
field which supplies to the public a service 
or product which is consumed or used by the 
public. We therefore conclude that the 
revenue ordinance which classified plain-
tiffs as a separate class of p-ublic utility 
for the purpose of taxation is reasonable 
and not discriminatory." Mountain States 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Ogden City, 487 P.2d 
849, 850 (Utah, 1971) (Emphasis added). 
See, also Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Ames, 
4 N.E.2d 494; In Re Opinion of the Justices, 
149 A. 321; and Salt Lake City v. Christensen 
Co., 95 P. 523 cited in the case above quoted. 
Other jurisdictions have unanimously held that such a 
classification is justified. A few other citations support-
ing this position are as follows: Commonwealth v. Appalachian 
Power Co., 68 S.E.2d 122 (Va., 1951), imposing a tax on 
every business furnishing water, heat, light and power, 
whether by electricity or gas; In the Opinion of Justices, 
137 A.2d 726 (N.H., 1958), wherein the State of New Hampshire 
upheld a special tax levied solely on the franchises of gas 
and electric utilities; In re the Opinion of Justices, 149 
A. 321 (N.H., 1930), wherein the State Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire upheld a franchise tax on gas and electric utili-
tics and excluded all other franchisees; Illinois Bell Tel. 
~: v. AmeE, 4 N.E.2d 494 (Ill., 1936), wherein the State of 
Illinois imposed a gross receipt tax on each public utility 
ir1 the business of transmitting telegraph or telephone 
Jnessaqro, sellinq water, gas or electricity: Potomac Electric 
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Pm-IC:r ~_'::__:_ Haze12, 90 F.2d 406 (CA DC, 1937), which upheld 
a gross receipt t~x by the District of Colu~bia on several 
utilities including gas, electric, transportation and tele-
phone companies based on their gross earnings for the pre-
ceding year. 
The Appellant-Telephone Company's nrlef attempts to 
distinguish this unanimous case law by: (a) Ignoring the 
fact that the City ordinance taxes its competitors, and 
(b) Asserting that the decisions were prior to the time the 
1968 Carterfore and the 1974 Telerant decisions, subjecting 
them to increased competition. 
Significantly, Appellant does not cite even one case 
where a state has foJnd such a utility taxing classification 
unreasonable in th2 ten intervening years since Carterfore. 
In fact, it must be noted that there is not even an assertion 
that the states in the 4th Circuit, sJch as Virginia, have 
reversed their approval of such classifications after the 
4th Circuit court of Appeals' decision of Telerant, relied 
upon by the Appellant. 
The writer's research supports the silence of Appellant's 
Brief. There appear to be no rulings as now urged by the 
Appellant to overrule lhis Court's 1971 holding, that the 
utilities are a separate taxing class. 
The existence of some competition in the sale or leasing 
of terminal eauipment is only one of many factors to be 
considered in a classification decision. It is noted by 
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the llnit0d States Supreme Court and approved by this Court, 
tl1ese companies enjoy a unique ?OSition in society and under 
our laws. The law is presumed constitutional and if there 
is any reasonable basis to sustain the legislative classifica-
tion it must be upheld by the Court. 
There certainly exists no issues of fact to be resolved 
on this facial classification issue. Therefore, it is res-
pectfully submitted that the issue of classification has 
already been decided by this Court; however, in any event, the 
case law is abundant and not subject to challenge at this 
date. The classification of the Appellant and the other 
utilities is lawful in all particulars and within the legis-
lative prerogative of Salt Lake City Corporation. 
POINT IV 
THE COMPANY' S CLAIMS l\.RE BARRED BY THE 
PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA. 
The Appellant-Company's Brief cleverly fails to emphasize 
that its present suit not only challenges the City Business 
Revenue Tax, but also the Franchise Fee for use of City 
streets which dates back to 1951. Its suit also seeks cash 
reimbursement of all monies paid to the City since July l, 
1977. Importantly, virtually all of the issues raised in the 
within case could have been or were, in fact, raised in a 
1970 suit that was dismissed by stipulation, with prejudice. 
The principles of res judicata prohibit a plaintiff from 
cnrnrt~cnc ing a second action on legal and factual issues, which 
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hos been or which could huve been resolved in a previous s11it. 
Justice Cardozo accurutely stated the principle as follows: 
"A judgment in one action is conclusive in a 
later one, not only as to any matters actually 
litigated therein, but also as to any that 
might have been so litigated, when the two 
causes of action have such a measure of iden-
tity that a different judgment in the second 
would destroy or impair rights or interests 
established by the first." Schuylkill Fuel 
Corp. v. B.& C. Nieberg Realty Corp., 165 
N.E. 456, 457 cited with approval in Ripley 
v. Storer, 132 N.E.2d 87, 90 (N.Y., 1956) 
(Emphasis added). 
The rule has similarly been summarized as follows: 
"Another statement of the rule [res judicata] 
is that any right, fact or matter in issue, 
and directly adjudicated on, or necessarily 
involved in, the determination of an action 
before 2 c~mpetent court in which a judgment 
OrdecrB=- is rendered on the merits is con-
clusively settled by the judgment therein 
and cannot again be litigated between the 
parties and privies whether or not the claim 
or demand, purpose, or subject matter of the 
two suits is the same." 50 C.J.S. Ju-dgments-
§7l2 p. 173, cited in- Ripley-v-:-storer, Id. 
at p. 93 (Emphasis added). --
The courts have been explicit in stating that the policy 
reasons behind this rule is to protect the parties and allow 
reliance on previous litigation; further, the rule pro-
duces judicial economy by putting an end to contests of 
determined issues. A good summary of this rationale is 
stated as follows: 
"On the other hand, as pointed out in 17 
Iowa Law Review 81, the desirability of a 
prompt decision on the merits has been em-
phasized by this court. The doctrine of 
res judicata, justified by practical n0ccs-
sity, is designed to promulgate equal justice 
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for all litigants, and parties should not be 
required to relitigate issues 1vhich they 
have already litigated or have had a reason-
abl~portunity to litigate. Once a party 
has had an opportunity to be heard he has 
had his day in court and cannot thereafter 
be he~rd to complain, especially if it can 
be sald that he had the opportunity to be 
heard on decisive merj.ts." Stuker v. County 
of Muscatine, 87 N.W.2d452, 457(1-ow""El; __ _ 
1958) (Emphasis added). 
Likewise, this Court stated: 
"'The foundation principle upon which the 
doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties 
ought not to be permitted to litigate the same 
issue more than once; that, when a right or 
fact has been judicially tried and determined 
by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an 
opportunity for such trial has been given, 
the judgment of the court, so long as it 
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon 
the parties, and those in privity with them 
in law or estate . . . public policy and the 
interest of the litigants alike require that 
there be an end to litigation, and the 
peace and order of society demand that 
matters distinctly put in issue and determined 
ey_a court of competent jurisdiction as 
to parties and subject matter shall not be 
retried between the same parties in any subse-
quent suit in any court." Mathews v. Mathews, 
102 Utah 428, 132 P.2d 111 (Utah, 1942) 
(Emphasis added); Curry v. Educoa Pre-School, Inc. 
580 P.2d 222 (Utah, 1978). 
This Court has also emphasized: 
"Policy would seem to dictate that when a 
plaintiff has once attempted to obtain his 
entire relief, based upon his entire claim, 
then the matter should be laid to rest. He 
should be denied a second attempt at sub-
stantially the same objective under a differ-
ent guise." Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2~ 
45-,-376 P.2d 946, 948 (Utah, 1962) (Emphasls 
added) citing Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined 
57 Yal<' L.3. 339, 346. See also, Campos v. 
camp~52J P.2d 1235 (Utah, 1974); Nationa~ 
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Findncc Co. oE Provo v. DalPv, 14 Utah 20 
2TI;--~P.2~1-405{utah-,--l9-GJ); Sine v. Helland, 
18 utuh 2d 22, 480 (1966); I·Jarrer1-:I"rilgatT6n __ _ 
Co. v. Brown, 28 Utah 2cl l03,-;f9s-:P·::zcf--6-67~--
670 (1972); Wood v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 133, 
427 P. 2cl 398 (1967). 
As the undisputed facts in the case before the bar 
demonstrate, the Telephone Company commenced litigation in 
1970. See, the Complaint in the case of Mountain States Tel. 
& Tel. Co., et al. v. Salt Lake City, R-439. This la•.vsui t 
directly involved the Franchise Ordinance now under attack 
and the Business Revenue Tax, which imposed an occupation 
tax based on the utility company's gross receipts. This 
former litigation also specifically called in question the 
validity of the Business Revenue Taxing Ordinance scheme 
and included, l~' .Lls legal challenge, the assertion that the 
percentage o= gross revenue taxation was constitutionally 
infirm, because of "discrimination" which allegedly violated 
the State and Federal Constitutions. Further, the plaintiff 
alleged that the Business Revenue Tax was invalid as being 
in contravention of State enabling statutes and, otherwise 
sought to have the tax declared unconstitutional. See, 
Statement of Facts 1 through 6. 
In the within controversy, the Telephone Company is 
again represented by the same legal counsel who represented 
it in the former suit. Here, again it has hashed up the sane 
lequl arguments seeking to have the same Business Revenue 
Tux scheme declared "i lle<Jal," "uncnforccahlc" and "uncon-
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stilutional." This Company is not only trying to obtain 
",~;ubstantially the same objecti·:e," but, in fact, seeks 
cxactl~ the same objective as it sought in the earlier 
litigation. 
Obviously the Telephone Company is prohibited in this 
redundant suit from relitigating the same factual and legal 
issues pursuant to the authority above quoted. However, 
some amplification concerning the specific allegations of 
the latest complaint will, perhaps, be of some assistance 
to the Court, because Appellant's Brief fails to reveal the 
full scope of that pleading, upon which they seek a further 
hearing. 
A. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Count I of the Company's Co~plaint alleges that the 
Utility Revenue Tax and Franchise Tax is illegal and uncon-
stitutional because it is alleged that the gross revenue 
aspect of the tax constitutes a "utility rate increase". 
This substantive issue is discussed in Point I, supra. 
However, the allegation is, further, barred from additional 
hearing by the principle of res judicata. 
In 1970 the Telephone Company sought to declare the 
same City ordinance unconstitutional and invalid. The 
present pleading presents a legal issue which was not 
previously articulated in the former litigation; however, 
i 1~ vJas one which could and should have been raised in that 
' , r·] i <'!" suit. This tact is true because the Business Revenue 
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Tax and Franchise Fee pass through provisions were known 
to exist at that earlier time. See, Statement of Fact No. 2. 
Thus, Count I of the Telephone Company's Complaint, 
if it had any legal viability, could and should have been 
raised in the earlier 1970 suit. Certainly, it should not 
now be able to attack a rate scheme it conceived, lobbied, 
legally defended in 1951, yet failed to challenge in its 
1970 suit. The stipulated dismissal of prejudice of that 
1970 suit bars the present attempted resurrection. 
B. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Count II of the Telephone Company's Complaint asserts 
that the Franchise Fee ordinance and the Business Revenue 
Tax is illegal A:•~ unconstitutional, because it allegedly 
is not "reasonably proportional" to the cost of service 
rendered by the City in implementing the ordinance. In 
the alternative, the Company asserts that the ordinance does 
not ''require" the fee to be reasonably proportional to the 
cost of service. Further, plaintiff asserts that the City 
taxing scheme imposes taxes on plaintiff "disproportionally" 
and without a "rational basis". 
The cause of action is so lacl:ing in merit that Appel-
lant did not even address it in its Brief. In brief, this 
claim fails as a matter of law, because the assertions 
apply only to regulatory actions and not strictly revenue 
wcasures as are involved in this case. 
~emorandum of Law, Q-424-426. 
-40-
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However, these legal theories were also generally pled 
in paragraph X of the 1970 litigations's Complaint, when 
the Company alleged that the tax was discriminatory to the 
Plaintiff in contravention of the Federal and Utah Constitu-
tions. It was further generally pled in the earlier litiga-
tion in the assertion that the Revenue Tax provisions vio-
lated Section 10-8-80 Utah Code Ann., 1953. Thus, the 
claims are barred under the principle of res judicata. 
C. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Some portions of plaintiff's Third Cause of Action 
concern allegations of alleged discriminatory enforcement of 
Section 20-3-14.1 of the City Ordinances. These provisions 
impose a tax on companies which compete with the telephone 
company and, hence, admittedly involve issues which have 
not been litigated in the earlier proceedings. Thus, the 
principle of res judicata would not apply; however, estoppel 
by judgment does bar this claim and this legal theory will 
be discussed hereafter. 
However, to the extent that Company's Third Cause of 
Action may purport to assert an illegal classification 
of the Telephone company, Utah Power & Light and Mountain 
States Fuel Supply Company or to assert that these utilities 
are not a distinct and separate class of residents in Salt 
Lake city (which are subject to an occupation tax based on 
gross revenues) , the principle of res judicata certainly 
apply. 
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It should specifically be noted that plaintiff's com-
plaint in the 1970 litigation alleges that Section 10-8-80 
and other applicable State and Federal constitutional pro-
visions were violated by the alleged discriminatory classifi-
cation of these organizations for a gross revenue tax. 
The Utah Supreme Court decisively ruled against this 
assertion in the Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Ogden, 
supra, case. Thus, in addition to the principle of stare 
decisis, the plaintiff is conclusively barred from again 
raising this issue under the principle of res judicata, 
by virtue of their stipulated dismissal of the former litiga-
tion. 
Collaterally, it is important to note that the 1967 
amendments to ~ec~.Jn 20-3-14 of the Revised City Ordinances 
did not change the classification affecting the plaintiff 
in any particular. These amendments did increase the 
Business Revenue Tax from four to six percent; further, they 
did add a provision including competitors of the utilities 
within the class of persons subject to the tax. However, 
the classification did not exclude any member previously 
taxed and, thus, plaintiff cannot assert that it is suffer-
ing from any deprivation or burden by an attempt of the City 
to tax others who may be competing with this plaintiff. 
A forliori there has been no change in the classifica-
tion which would allow plaintiff to rolitigate and assert 
that they are improperly or discriminatorily classed. 
-42-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Rather, there have only been added additional parties which 
would reduce any discriminatory impact on the plaintiff, 
even though this Court has ruled that any such discrimina-
tory impact did not raise it to the level which created an 
impermissible classification in a constitutional sense. 
What the Telephone Company is obviously attempting to 
do is to put old legal theories in new bottles, which it 
may not do. Appellant is attempting to have a "second 
shot" at establishing the facts for its old legal theories 
to show discriminatory classification or application of 
the gross revenue taxation or revenue fees. 
An interesting case concerning the latter point and 
one closely on target for the issues in the present litiga-
tion is McCarthy v. State, l Utah 2d 205, 265 P.2d 387, 389 
(1953); 49 A.L.R.2d 1031. In this case a California contrac-
tor sued the State of Utah in Federal Court, together with 
individual members of a Monument Commission, appointed by 
the State. The Federal Court dismissed all parties, specifi-
cally stating that the State of Utah could not be sued by a 
citizen of another state, under Article XI of the United 
States Constitution. However, the Federal Court made no 
specific finding as to why the individual members of the 
1·1onument Conunission were dismissed. 
Thereafter, the plaintiff sued in the State court and 
the suit was dismissed because the Court ruled that the 
former i 1ction constituted a bar to subsequent litigation on 
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implied findings of the Federal court. The State Supreme 
Court upheld the findings of the lower state court by holding 
that inasmuch as all elements of diversity were present in 
the Federal Court, the principle of res judicata barred fur-
ther litigation. The Court held that the Federal judge 
implicitly found that the individual members of the commission 
were not liable and that the obligation was one belonging 
solely to the State of Utah. The Utah Supreme Court speci-
fically observed: 
"And this is true notwithstanding the fact 
that the Court made no such written finding. 
The issue having been squarely presented and 
determined, it is res judicata as between 
these parties." McCarthy v. Stat~, Id. at 
p. 38 9. 
Addressing the I~~ue of res judicata our court correctly 
noted: 
"Any other view would create uncertainty by 
undermining the conclusive character of judg-
ments and would permit the revival of litiga-
tion once terminated; consequences which it 
was the very purpose of the doctrine of res 
judicata to avoid." McCarthy v. State, Id. 
at p. 389. 
It is further noted: 
"Whether its judgment was right or wrong, it 
stands unassailed and is binding upon the 
parties." (Emphasis added) Id. at p. 389. 
The plaintiff raised the entire spectrum of discriminatory 
application and classificatjon in the previous litigation. It 
had every opportunity to litigate these issues; in fact, they 
commenced separate actions against Salt Lake Cjty and Ogden 
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City over thes0 precise legal and factual disputes. 
The Salt Lake litiqation was terminated, by stipulation 
based on this Court's decision in favor of Ogden City, by 
able counsel who agreed that the matter should be terminated 
"with prejudice". The Telephone Company, thus, had full and 
ample opportunity to litigate all of the issues both legal 
and factual relating to these allegations, together with any 
other issue concerning the legality, constitutionality or 
validity of a Gross Receipt Business Revenue Tax or Franchise 
Fee. The Company forever barred from raising these issues 
against the City again. 
POINT V 
THE PLAINTIFF IS BARRED BY THE PRINCIPLE 
OF COLLATERAL JUDGMENT ESTOPPEL FROM 
CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF THE BUSINESS 
REVENUE TAX AND THE FRANCHISE FEE PROVI-
SIONS OF THE CITY ORDINANCES. 
Although closely related, a separate and distinct legal 
principle of estoppel by judgment may operate to bar a 
litigant from challenging a judgment or another's reasonable 
reliance on that judgment. 
The commentators have summarized the principle as 
follows: 
"The circumstances of a particular case may be 
such as to estop a person from setting up the 
invalidity of a judgment. In this connection 
it has been held that a party cannot be heard 
to impeach a judgment which he himself has 
procured to be entered in his own favor, and 
that one who accepts and retains the fruits 
of a judrJrnent is estopped from denylng ltS 
validity. Ur.1_der this rule, lt has been held 
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that one who accepts the honefits of a judgment 
should be "Jrecluded froM ouestionincJ t:h0vaTIC:f..: 
ity of the• burJel1lri\P;::;se(l~S::· an express condi-
tion on which the judgment v;as granted." 4 6 
Am.Jur.2d, Judgments §51 at p. 350 (Emphasis 
added). 
Also, this work correctly noted: 
"In this respect, it has been declared that in 
the application of the doctrine of estoppel 
by former verdict or collateral estoppel, it 
is immaterial that the prior action sounded 
in tort and the later one in contract, or vice 
versa." 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments §429 at p. 
599. 
The writer has found no Utah cases specifically address-
ing collateral estoppel by judgment; rather, the cases dis-
cussed in Point IV, supra, appear to merge the two principles 
into a discussion of res judicata. The Court has, however, 
recently expl<i ',E'- its vie•.- of collateral estoppel which is 
SQ~arized as fellows: 
"The interests of justice here require adherence 
to the time-honored principle that where one 
of two innocent parties must suffer a loss, 
it should fall on him who created the circum-
stances from which it resulted." Hanson v. 
Beehive Security Company, 14 U.2d 157, 380 
P.2d 66, 67 (Utah, 1963); Migliaccio v. Davis, 
232 P.2d 195, 198 (Utah, 1951). 
This rule is particularly applicable as in the present 
situation where the Salt Lake City Corporation has relied on 
the actions of the plaintiff and the decision of the Utah 
Supn:cme Court in funding its municipal operations. Approxi-
matcly 20~ or in excess or $8,000,000 of its budget for the 
creneral fund comes from these sourc,•s. The Cily should 
certAinly bc• cnllt-lcd to every '"'·.'Or.>blr· cnnstruction of 
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the principles of E~s judicata and collateral and direct 
esto['pel, to protect it in its reliance upon the earlier 
suit's dismissal. 
Further, in the case before the bar, there are two dis-
tinct issues which require the application of the principle 
of collateral estoppel by judgment. The first, concerns the 
Franchise Fee. The facts are not in dispute and demonstrate 
that in the early 1950's the plaintiff petitioned the Public 
Service Commission for authority to pass through, as a sur-
charge to its billing, the Franchise Fee for the privilege it 
had of the unfettered use of all public streets, roadways and 
other rights-of-way. Further, the plaintiff appeared with 
its present attorney in 1953 and was successful in pursuading 
the Utah Supreme Court that such a provision, as it urged 
upon the Public Service Commission was legal, valid and 
constitutional in all particulars. 
No. 3. 
See, Statement of Fact 
Thereafter, the Appellant-Company has enjoyed all of the 
fruits and benefits of that arrangement. For some 25 years 
it has dug up City str~ets and hung its wires on public 
easements without having to resort to its power of eminent 
domain to purchase and acquire rights-of-way of its own. 
See, Plaintiff's Answer to Defendant's Request for Admissions 
and Interrogatories No. 6 anc I. 
In additior1, the City has relief on the revenue gener-
aL0d from this source for pre~aring and expending tax revenues 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
since 1953, without objeclion 01: chc:lllenge until the v:ithin 
litigation. Even in the 1970 suit which challenged the Busi-
ness Revenue Tax, the utility companies did not seck to raise 
in issue the Franchise Fee provisions, which extend for a 
period of 50 years from the date of the agreement. However, 
even if it had, it is a fact that the Telephone Company 
dismissed that challenge by stipulation, "with prejudice". 
The law concerning such dismissals is clearly articulated 
and certainly a matter subject to reasonable reliance by the 
Salt Lake City Corporation. It is summarized as follows: 
"The term '1·:ith prejudice," expressed in a 
judgment of dismissal, has a well-recognized 
legal import; it is, of course, the converse 
of 'withou:_ : t-eJudice' and indicates an adjudi-
cation of th merits, operating as res judi-
cata, concluding the rights of the parties, 
terminating the right of action, and precluding 
subsequent litigation of the same cause of 
action, to the same extent as if the action 
had been prosecuted to a fin~l adjudication 
adverse to the plaintiff. Accordingly, a 
judgment so rendered operates, in a subse-
quent action on the same cause of action, so 
as to conclusively settle not only all matters 
litigated in the earlier proceedings, but also 
all matters which might have been litigated 
therein." 46 Arn.Jur.2d, Judgments §482 at p. 
645 (Emphasis added). 
Clearly, the Appellant is estopped from challenging the 
validity of the 1953 Franchise Fee assessment and collection 
procedures under these principles by its 1953 and 1970 
suits. 
With referenc~ lo the Business Revenue Tax, the City 
has based its hu~gcts and reasonably relied on the Co~pany's 
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~__1 j ~In i ssaJ in cstabl ishing scr-·ice levels for the City 
consL i tuency, based on rc·.•enucc from the Business Revenue 
Tax imposed on the utilities since 1971. The company should, 
likewise, be enjoined and estopped from its present attack 
on that method of financing. 
It is respectfully submitted that Company's entire 
claim's dismissal should be affirmed by this Court. It is 
collaterally estopped by the judgments heretofore rendered, 
at its solicitation or by its stipulation, especially since 
the Company has enjoyed the benefits and fruits of that 
litigation since 1953 and the City's reasonable reliance 
thereon. 
SUMMARY 
The City has passed an occupation tax and imposed a fee 
for franchise privileges (accepted and utilized by the Tele-
phone Company), consistent with the enabling power granted 
the City by the Utah Legislature. The Public Service 
Cornmission, by order approved by this Court, has authorized 
those fees and taxes to be passed through to the Appellant-
Company's customers, when the Company files appropriate 
notice of the local tax impositions. Thus, the City has not 
usurped the Public Service Co~ission function of rate 
setting and the Appellant-Company's assertion to the contrary 
is specious. 
The Appellant-Company's Brief fails to note the signifi-
cant distinction between a challenge to the facial classifi-
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cation and validity of a taxing ordinance and an alleged 
discriminatory application of a valid statute. The bastardiza-
tion of these two theories is improper and they must be 
separated for proper analysis. 
l~ith reference to the facial classification of tax-
payers for taxing purposes, the legal principles are well 
established. Such laws are presumed constitutional and every 
reasonable presumption will be indulged in by the Court to 
uphold their validity. In short, legislative bodies have 
the broadest latitude in forming classifications. Taxing 
laws will be held unconstitutional only if the courts can 
find no re~s~~~Gle basis to justify the classification and 
where the law patently fails to equally treat persons 
similarly situated. 
In the instant case. the ordinance, on its face, in-
cludes within the scope of a classification of persons taxed, 
all competitors of the three named utilities. Thus, as a 
matter of law there can be no factual or legal issues con-
cerning proper facial classification 
Further, to challenge an alleged discriminatory appli-
cation of a taxing statute, one must allege and establish 
that there was an intentional systematic failure to uniform~ 
apply the tax. The Appellant-Company has failed even to 
allege such a theory. 
In addition, the undisputej facts of record demonstrate 
that the City has exerted a qooc faith effort to equitably 
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and uniformly apply the taxing ordinance. Thus, the Appel-
lant's Brief fails to state' a claim upon which relief can 
be granted and, further has failed to establish any dis-
puted issues of fact to oppose the City's 11otion for Summary 
Judgment. 
The Telephone Company-.ll.ppellant has, further, attempted 
to resurrect a legal dispute which originated in a suit 
filed in 1970 by it and two other utility companies. That 
suit involved virtually identical issues of fact and law. 
How~ver, after an adverse ruling on the major points, all 
the plaintiffs, including this Appellant-Company, stipulated 
to a dismissal of that suit, with prejudice. 
Therefore, all of the issues which were raised or which 
could have been raised in the former litigation are barred 
from retrial in the present litigation under the principle 
of res judicata. The issues thus barred include: 
(a) The allegation of its First Cause of Action that 
Salt Lake City is illegally setting utility rates, 
(b) The allegation of its Second Cause of Action that 
the gross revenue tax is not reasonably proportional to the 
costs of service rendered by Salt Lake City in implementing 
or enforcing the tax and, 
(c) The tax is illegal, unconstitutional or beyond 
the City enabling power. 
Also, each of those subjects are barred under the 
,,,·inciplc> of collateral estoppel by judgment. 
- s 1-
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Thus, the Appellant-Telephone Company's Complaint fails 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. There 
are no material issues of fact and the lower court properly 
dismissed the litigation. This Court should affirm the 
lower court's ruling. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROGER F, CUTLER 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
Attorney for Respondent 
101 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 535-7788 
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